125 search results - page 5 / 25 » Mechanism Design with Partial Revelation |
97
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ICALP
2010
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
TIP
1998
14 years 9 months ago
1998
— The design of the optimal codebook for a given codebook size and input source is a challenging puzzle that remains to be solved. The key problem in optimal codebook design is h...
ECOOP
1998
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
1998
Springer
Customizable meta-objects are a powerful abstraction for extending language features and implementation mechanisms, but interpretive execution suffers from severe performance penal...
101
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SIGECOM
2005
ACM
15 years 3 months ago
2005
ACM
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
DAGSTUHL
2007
14 years 11 months ago
2007
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into three parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and the formation of matches based...