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SIAMJO
2010
61views more  SIAMJO 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
Penalty Methods for the Solution of Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
Francisco Facchinei, Christian Kanzow
CDC
2009
IEEE
118views Control Systems» more  CDC 2009»
15 years 3 months ago
Nash equilibrium problems with congestion costs and shared constraints
Abstract— Generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) represent extensions of the Nash solution concept when agents have shared strategy sets. This generalization is particularly relevant ...
Huibing Yin, Uday V. Shanbhag, Prashant G. Mehta
96
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JSAC
2008
140views more  JSAC 2008»
14 years 10 months ago
Optimality and Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in the Coverage Game
In this paper, we investigate the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks using a game theory method. We assume that nodes are randomly scattered in a sensor field and the goa...
Xin Ai, Vikram Srinivasan, Chen-Khong Tham
80
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INFORMATICALT
2002
150views more  INFORMATICALT 2002»
14 years 10 months ago
Search for Dynamic Equilibrium in Duel Problems by Global Optimization
Two examples of open-loop differential games are considered in the paper. Starting with simplified dynamic Duel, further it was developed to differential economic Duel modelling pr...
Raimundas Matulevicius
105
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SAGT
2010
Springer
160views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
The PPAD-completeness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case. This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in ...
Paul W. Goldberg