119
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SIGECOM
15 years 7 months ago
2009 ACM 
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
115
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SIGECOM
15 years 7 months ago
2009 ACM 
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
108
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SIGECOM
15 years 7 months ago
2009 ACM 
The Target Set Selection problem proposed by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos, gives a nice clean combinatorial formulation for many problems arising in economy, sociology, and medicin...
113
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SIGECOM
15 years 7 months ago
2009 ACM
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other ...
SIGECOM
15 years 7 months ago
2009 ACM |
ECommerce